Judge Spain Tosses Oakland Public Ethics Commission Case vs. Mayor Thao Recall

Judge Spain handed the Nicholas Heidorn-ran Oakland Public Ethics Commission and Oakland Mayor Thao an Embarrassing Outcome

Oakland (Special to ZennieReport.com) – To say this means the Oakland Public Ethics Commission went down in flames is an understatement. It’s going to be interesting to see how new public relations flack Casey Pratt handles this on behalf of his friend / boss Oakland Mayor Sheng Thao.

It was Mayor Thao who personally, and arguably illegally, pointed to the Oakland Public Ethics Commission “investigation” into the effort to recall her, as one that would bear enough fruit to stop her eventual ouster by Oakland voters. In effect, the Mayor was weaponizing the Oakland Public Ethics Commission against the effort to recall her.

Now, she’s toast.

According to the official court document, the case falls on both form and constitutional considerations. Judge Spain wrote “The Subpoenas Are Not Code-Compliant”, and “The Subpoenas Are Unconstitutional”. From the document making the declaration, Judge Spain wrote:

ANALYSIS
A. The Subpoenas Are Not Code-Compliant (2 C.C.R., § 10027 (d)) As a preliminary matter, the subpoenas at issue are not code-compliant because they failed to provide Respondents with adequate time to respond. (2 C.C.R., § 10027, subd. (d).) The
California Code of Regulations requires that the subpoena allow the person or organization responding to a subpoena a “reasonable time for compliance” which shall “[i]n no event” indicate a date for compliance that is “less than fifteen (15) days after the date service of the subpoena is completed.” (2 C.C.R., § 10027, subd. (d).)
Here, the subpoenas were served on May 21, 2024 (Russell Decl. ¶ 11; Exh. I) and demanded compliance by May 29, 2024. (Russell Decl. ¶ 11; Exh. H.) They further specified that no extensions would be granted absent good cause. (Ibid.) Although Petitioners have since conceded that their subpoenas failed to allow sufficient time to respond and therefore were not code compliant, their agreement to continue the date of the hearing does not cure this defect or otherwise or invalidate Respondents’ objections to the subpoena on this basis.

B. The Subpoenas Are Unconstitutional
Apart from failing to comply with minimum statutory requirements, the subpoenas at issue are unconstitutional because they seek (absent due process) documents outside of Respondents’ possession, custody and control and purport to extend into to the private records of unnotificial individuals – some of whom are at best peripherally associated with Respondents.
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding is notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of their obligations and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. (Edward W. v. Lamkins (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 516, 529.) Here, while the Notice of Subpoenas (“Notices”) at issue were served on Respondents,
they purported to search the private records of entire categories of individuals associated with Respondents without providing notice to those individuals who remained only generally referenced and unidentified.

For example, the Notice served on Foundational Oakland Unities states the following: “you are required to search the records of your officers, treasurers, employees, contractors, volunteers, or agents who might reasonably have some of the records sought, including the following individuals specified on the subpoena:

• Stacy Owens;
• Peter Sullivan;
• Tanya Boyce;
• Andrew Hock; and
• Seneca Scott”
  (Russell Decl. at Exh. H: Notice of Subpoena # 240008-03.) Similarly-worded Notices were served on OUST and Foundational Oakland United, requiring them to search the records of their “officers, treasurers, employees, contractors, volunteers, [and] agents” for responsive documents as well. (Russell Decl. at Exh. H: Notice of Subpoena #
  240008-04; Notice of Subpoena # 240008-07.) While it may be appropriate to have Respondents search records in their possession, custody or control, the notices here purport to reach beyond the scope of the subpoenaed party’s records and
  into the private records of Respondents’ “officers, treasurers, employees, contractors, volunteers, or agents” without first serving those individuals with notice that their private documents are to be searched.
  First, absent a separate subpoena (or notice at the very least) to the unidentified individuals (described as Respondents’ “officers, treasurers, employees, contractors, volunteers, or agents”) whose personal records are sought, Petitioner has not provided these individuals with due process because the notice served on Respondents does not inform these individuals that documents in their possession, custody or control are being searched as part of an investigation.

The Full Judge Spain Court Explanation

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
24CV081048: IN THE MATTER OF: CITY OF OAKLAND PUBLIC ETHICS
COMMISSION
07/26/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel .; filed by CITY OF OAKLAND PUBLIC
ETHICS COMMISSION (Petitioner) in Department 520
Tentative Ruling – 07/24/2024 Julia Spain
The Motion to Compel NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO COMPEL OAKLAND
UNITED TO RECALL SHENG THAO, FOUNDATIONAL OAKLAND UNITED, and
FOUNDATIONAL OAKLAND UNITES COMPLIANCE WITH THE CITY OF OAKLAND
PUBLIC ETHICS COMMISSIONS INVESTIGATIVE SUBPOENAS filed by CITY OF
OAKLAND PUBLIC ETHICS COMMISSION on 06/27/2024 is Denied.
Petitioner City of Oakland Public Ethics Commission’s (“Petitioner”) Motion to Compel
Compliance with the subpoenas served on May 21, 2024 is DENIED in its entirety.
The subpoenas as a whole are neither code-compliant nor constitutional. (2 C.C.R., § 10027 (d);
N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama (1958) 357 U.S. 449, 460–461; Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d
844, 852–853; Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984) 468 U.S. 609, 617–618; Pacific-Union,
supra, 232 Cal.App.3d 60, 70.) Moreover, though independently insignificant in light of the
Court’s ruling, categories 1(d) and 2(b) additionally lack parameters sufficient to make them
“reasonably relevant” to Petitioner’s investigation. (Kirchmeyer v. Helios Psychiatry Inc. (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 352, 359; Brovelli v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 524, 529.)
BACKGROUND
On May 21, 2024, Petitioner served Respondents Oakland United to Recall Sheng Thao
(“OUST”), Foundational Oakland United and Foundational Oakland Unities (“FOU”)
(collectively “Respondents”) with investigative subpoenas requiring a return date of May 29,
2024 at 4:00 p.m. and indicating that no extensions would be granted absent good cause. (Russell
Decl. ¶ 11; Exh. H.) In particular, the subpoenas at issue seek the following categories of
documents from Respondents:

1. All written records concerning or referencing funds actually or potentially raised by or offered
   to [Respondents] that also:
   a. reference or concern an actual or potential recall campaign against Oakland Mayor Sheng
   Thao;
   b. reference or concern the actual or potential payment of expenditures for signature-gathering or
   petitioning services;
   c. reference or concern the earmarking of contributions or payments made to Foundational
   Oakland United for purposes of making a contribution to a specifically identified campaign
   committee or ballot measure; or
   d. contain any of the following keywords:
   SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
   COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
   24CV081048: IN THE MATTER OF: CITY OF OAKLAND PUBLIC ETHICS
   COMMISSION
   07/26/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel .; filed by CITY OF OAKLAND PUBLIC
   ETHICS COMMISSION (Petitioner) in Department 520

• “sheng”;
• “thao” ;
• “recall”;
• “mayor”;
• “oust”;
• “private” ;
• anonymous”;
• “secret”; IX . ” identity”;
• “identify”;
• “name”; or
• “earmark.”

1. All written records concerning or referencing:
   a. the making of a monetary or non-monetary contribution to Oakland United to Recall Sheng
   Thao; or
   b. any actual or potential contract with, or payment to, any of the following entities:

• The Halftone Shop; or
• On The Ground

1. All written records: a. referencing or concerning the drafting or sending of the email message
   included as Attachment lb to this subpoena; or b. received by or sent from the address
   an****@fo***********************.org referencing or concerning donations as described in
   Attachment lb.
   (Russell Decl. ¶ 11; Exh. H.)
   The notice attaching the subpoenas further instructed: “you are required to search the records of
   your officers, directors, treasurers, employees, contractors, volunteers, or agents who might
   reasonably have some of the records sought.” (Russell Decl. ¶ 11; Exh. H.)
   Respondents responded to the subpoenas at issue on May 28, 2024, objecting that the subpoenas
   were not code-compliant, that the documents sought were protected by attorney-client privilege,
   that the document categories were overly broad, and further that the subpoenas as-drafted,
   infringed on the constitutional privacy rights of their members. (Russell Decl. ¶ 12; Exhs. J.)
   On June 6, 2024, Petitioner sent a response letter to Respondents indicating its disagreement with
   Respondents’ objections (Russell Decl. ¶ 13; Exh. K) and on June 13, 2024, Respondents
   responded to Petitioner’s correspondence, reiterating the basis for its objections. (Russell Decl. ¶
   14; Exh. L.)
   SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
   COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
   24CV081048: IN THE MATTER OF: CITY OF OAKLAND PUBLIC ETHICS
   COMMISSION
   07/26/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel .; filed by CITY OF OAKLAND PUBLIC
   ETHICS COMMISSION (Petitioner) in Department 520
   LAW
   A. Investigative Subpoena – Requirements & Scope
   Government Code section 11181 authorizes government department heads to “[i]nspect and copy
   books, records, and other items” and to “[i]ssue subpoenas for . . . the production of papers,
   books, accounts, documents, any writing as defined by Section 250 of the Evidence Code,
   tangible things, and testimony pertinent or material to any inquiry, investigation, hearing,
   proceeding, or action conducted in any part of the state.” (Gov. Code, § 11181, subds. (a); (e).)
   “During the course of an investigation, the department may issue and serve upon a person,
   corporation, partnership, association, public entity, or other organization a subpoena, on a form
   prescribed by the department, to require the attendance and testimony of a witness by deposition
   or other investigative proceeding or means including, without limitation, an investigative
   interview.” (2 C.C.R., § 10027, subd. (a).)
   “A subpoena for an investigative interview or deposition, or other investigative proceeding, also
   may require the production of books, records, documents, and physical materials in the
   possession of, or under the control of, the person or organization named on the subpoena.” (2
   C.C.R., § 10027, subd. (c).)
   “Service of a subpoena for an investigative interview or deposition, or other investigative
   proceeding, shall be made in compliance with section 12963.1(b) of the Government Code in
   such manner as to allow the person or organization named on the subpoena reasonable time for
   compliance. In no event shall an investigative subpoena indicate a date for appearance or
   compliance that is less than fifteen (15) days after the date service of the subpoena is
   completed.” (2 C.C.R., § 10027, subd. (d).)
   An investigative subpoena must be issued in a manner consistent with the state and federal
   Constitutions, and is valid if it:
   1) inquiries into matters the agency is authorized to investigate;
   2) is “not too indefinite,” and
   3) seeks information that is “reasonably relevant” to the investigation.
   (Kirchmeyer, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 359; Brovelli, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 529.)
   The agency issuing the investigative subpoena has authority to subpoena records regarding
   whether the entity under investigation is subject to the agency’s jurisdiction and whether there
   have been violations of provisions under the agency’s jurisdiction. (State Water Resources
   Control Board v. Baldwin & Sons, Inc. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 40, 56 citing to Brovelli, supra, 56
   Cal.2d at p. 529.)
   B. Constitutional Right to Privacy (Balancing of Interests)
   SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
   COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
   24CV081048: IN THE MATTER OF: CITY OF OAKLAND PUBLIC ETHICS
   COMMISSION
   07/26/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel .; filed by CITY OF OAKLAND PUBLIC
   ETHICS COMMISSION (Petitioner) in Department 520
   Where an investigative subpoena implicates the constitutional right to privacy, the court must
   balance the privacy rights at issue against the countervailing interests raised by the party issuing
   the subpoena. (Grafilo v. Wolfsohn (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1024, 1035.) In this context, “good
   cause” is shown by “competent evidence” that the records sought are relevant. (Ibid.)
   In Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, the California Supreme
   Court “established a framework for analyzing constitutional invasion of privacy claims”. Under
   this framework, the Court evaluates whether the information sought implicates a legally
   protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, and a threatened
   intrusion that is serious. (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 35-37.)
   The party seeking the information may then raise any legitimate, countervailing interests that
   disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives would
   diminish the loss of privacy. (Grafilo v. Cohanshohet (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 428, 437; Hill,
   supra 7 Cal.4th at pp. 37-40.) If a claimant meets all three criteria stated in Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th
   1, the court must then balance the privacy interest at stake against other countervailing interests.
   (Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 371.)
   ANALYSIS
   A. The Subpoenas Are Not Code-Compliant (2 C.C.R., § 10027 (d))
   As a preliminary matter, the subpoenas at issue are not code-compliant because they failed to
   provide Respondents with adequate time to respond. (2 C.C.R., § 10027, subd. (d).) The
   California Code of Regulations requires that the subpoena allow the person or organization
   responding to a subpoena a “reasonable time for compliance” which shall “[i]n no event”
   indicate a date for compliance that is “less than fifteen (15) days after the date service of the
   subpoena is completed.” (2 C.C.R., § 10027, subd. (d).)
   Here, the subpoenas were served on May 21, 2024 (Russell Decl. ¶ 11; Exh. I) and demanded
   compliance by May 29, 2024. (Russell Decl. ¶ 11; Exh. H.) They further specified that no
   extensions would be granted absent good cause. (Ibid.)
   Although Petitioners have since conceded that their subpoenas failed to allow sufficient time to
   respond and therefore were not code-compliant, their agreement to continue the date of the
   hearing does not cure this defect or otherwise or invalidate Respondents’ objections to the
   subpoena on this basis.
   B. The Subpoenas Are Unconstitutional
   Apart from failing to comply with minimum statutory requirements, the subpoenas at issue are unconstitutional because they seek (absent due process) documents outside of Respondents’ possession, custody and control and purport to extend into to the private records of unnotified individuals – some of whom are at best peripherally associated with Respondents.
   An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding is notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of their obligations and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. (Edward W. v. Lamkins (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 516, 529.) Here, while the Notice of Subpoenas (“Notices”) at issue were served on Respondents,
   they purported to search the private records of entire categories of individuals associated with
   Respondents without providing notice to those individuals who remained only generally
   referenced and unidentified.
   For example, the Notice served on Foundational Oakland Unities states the following: “you are required to search the records of your officers, treasurers, employees, contractors, volunteers, or agents who might reasonably have some of the records sought, including the
   following individuals specified on the subpoena:

• Stacy Owens;
• Peter Sullivan;
• Tanya Boyce;
• Andrew Hock; and
• Seneca Scott”
  (Russell Decl. at Exh. H: Notice of Subpoena # 240008-03.)
  Similarly-worded Notices were served on OUST and Foundational Oakland United, requiring
  them to search the records of their “officers, treasurers, employees, contractors, volunteers, [and]
  agents” for responsive documents as well. (Russell Decl. at Exh. H: Notice of Subpoena #
  240008-04; Notice of Subpoena # 240008-07.)
  While it may be appropriate to have Respondents search records in their possession, custody or
  control, the notices here purport to reach beyond the scope of the subpoenaed party’s records and
  into the private records of Respondents’ “officers, treasurers, employees, contractors, volunteers,
  or agents” without first serving those individuals with notice that their private documents are to
  be searched.
  First, absent a separate subpoena (or notice at the very least) to the unidentified individuals
  (described as Respondents’ “officers, treasurers, employees, contractors, volunteers, or agents”)
  whose personal records are sought, Petitioner has not provided these individuals with due
  process because the notice served on Respondents does not inform these individuals that
  documents in their possession, custody or control are being searched as part of an investigation.
  Second, the scope and nature of the subpoenas at issue violate these individuals’ constitutional
  privacy rights and also appears to offend the prohibition against unreasonable searches and
  seizures guaranteed to them by the federal Constitution. (Pacific-Union Club v. Superior Court
  (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 60, 70 (“Pacific-Union”).)
  Third, extending the subpoena beyond the scope of documents in the possession, custody or
  control of the named parties and into the private records of individuals associated with them
  infringes on the associated individuals’ freedom of intimate association and expressive
  association. (N.A.A.C.P., supra, 357 U.S. at pp. 460–461; Britt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 852–853;
  Roberts, supra, 468 U.S. at pp. 617–618.)
  “The supremacy of the federal Constitution is especially clear when . . . authorities demand or
  subpoena information: a court ‘has jurisdiction to determine whether the [authority’s] inquiry
  offends the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures or violates the right of privacy
  or the privilege against self-incrimination.’ [Citation.]” (Pacific-Union, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d
  60, 70.)
  While these issues were inadequately briefed by the parties, the Court remains unconvinced that
  a subpoena seeking access to records in the possession, custody or control of individuals can be
  valid or constitutional absent notice to that individual that their records are being searched as part
  of an investigation and adequately apprising that individual of what the investigation at issue is
  about.
  The privacy of personal association is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
  United States Constitution. (N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama (1958) 357 U.S. 449, 460–461; Britt v.
  Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 852–853.) The freedom to associate with the persons of
  one’s choice, without unwarranted governmental intervention or interference, is divided into two
  components: the freedom of intimate association and the freedom of expressive association.
  (Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984) 468 U.S. 609, 617–618.) Intimate association stands
  constitutionally protected because “choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human
  relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such
  relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme.”
  (Ibid.) Thus, “freedom of [intimate] association receives protection as a fundamental element of
  personal liberty.” (Id. at p. 618.)
  Freedom of expressive association stands protected as an “indispensable means of preserving”
  the liberty to “associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First
  Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of
  religion.” (Roberts, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 618.) The freedom of expressive association enjoys a
  “close nexus” with the freedom of speech (N.A.A.C.P., supra, 357 U.S. at p. 460) and embodies
  a “right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic,
  educational, religious, and cultural ends.” (Roberts, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 622.)
  
  The notices here demand that the subpoenaed party search the records of their “officers,
  treasurers, employees, contractors, volunteers, or agents.” While extending any subpoena beyond
  the scope of records in the possession, custody or control of the party named in the subpoena
  appears on its face unconstitutional, the validity of a subpoena requiring that a search to extend
  into the private records of the subpoenaed party’s “volunteers” and “agents” appears especially
  questionable given the undefined nature of the term “agent” and the tenuous connection that
  these individuals might have with Respondents’ organization in the event that they once
  volunteered to perform any task for the organization at all.
  Absent sufficient justification, the Court in good conscience cannot issue an order compelling
  compliance with Petitioner’s subpoenas where they blatantly violate due process, infringe on the
  privacy rights of unnamed individuals, require an unreasonable search of the private records and
  implicate the constitutional freedom of association of entire categories of individuals who were
  not provided notice of the subpoena at issue and were not informed that Petitioners sought access
  to their private records.
  C. Categories 1(d) and 2(b) Are Not “Reasonably Relevant” to the Investigation at Issue
  While the Court denies Petitioner’s motion in its entirety on the basis that the subpoenas are
  neither code-compliant nor constitutional (2 C.C.R., § 10027 (d); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama (1958)
  357 U.S. 449, 460–461; Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 852–853; Roberts v.
  United States Jaycees (1984) 468 U.S. 609, 617–618; Pacific-Union, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d 60,
  70), the Court additionally notes the subpoenas include two document categories (Categories
  1(d) and 2(b)) that lack sufficient parameters to make them “reasonably relevant” to Petitioner’s
  investigation. (Kirchmeyer, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 359; Brovelli, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 529.)
  Category 1(d) requests in relevant part:
  All written records concerning or referencing funds actually or potentially raised by or offered to [Respondents] that also contain any of the following keywords:
• Private
• Secret
• Identity
• Identify
• Anonymous and
• Name
  (Russell Decl. ¶ 11, Exh. H: Category 1 (d).)
  Category 2 (b) requests: All written records concerning or referencing “any actual or potential contract with, or payment
  to, any of the following entities: i. The Halftone Shop; or ii. On The Ground.” (Russell Decl. ¶
  11, Exh. H.)
  Neither of these categories are “reasonably relevant” to Petitioner’s investigation of thecampaign to recall Mayor Sheng Thao, Respondents’ suspected earmarking of funds for that purpose or of Respondents’ failure to report contributions exceeding a certain base amount. In particular, these categories lack any relevant parameters that identify the purpose for which the payments at issue were made and therefore are not “reasonably relevant” to the present investigation which itself is limited to the investigation of contributions made for a particular purpose. (Kirchmeyer, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 359; Brovelli, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 529.)
  Therefore, although the Court denies Petitioner’s motion on other grounds, Petitioner should
  strongly consider revising categories 1(d) and 2(b) in the event that they anticipate reissuing
  these subpoenas in the future.
  D. Documents Protected by Attorney Client Privilege
  Finally, addressing the parties’ arguments regarding Petitioner’s subpoena of communication
  documents from Respondents’ counsel, the Court agrees that the language of the subpoena and
  the document requests in particular did not make it abundantly clear that only non-privileged
  documents were being demanded.
  On Reply, Petitioner contends that “the Subpoenas, on their face, explicitly exclude “information
  legally privileged under the California Evidence Code.” (Reply p. 5:25-26, citing to Russell
  Decl. at Exh. H, Attach. 1a.) However, this statement is misleading.
  In full context, Attachment 1a (cited by Petitioner’s Reply) provides in relevant part:
  “For purposes of this subpoena, the use of the term “complete” in relation to a written record
  means that the version of the record produced under this subpoena shall not be redacted or
  abridged or in any way, other than information legally privileged under the California Evidence
  Code. Any redaction or withheld record must be accounted for on an accompanying privilege log
  with sufficient detail to identify the particular record being redacted or withheld, the sender(s)
  and recipient(s) of that record, and the basis for invoking a privilege as to that redaction or
  withheld record.”
  (Russell Decl. at Exh. H, Attach. 1a.)
  This excerpt expressly concedes that the subpoenas seek privileged documents and therefore
  purports to allow for their redaction in a sentence hidden under the definition of the term
  “complete.” (Russell Decl. at Exh. H, Attach. 1a.)
  SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
  COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
  24CV081048: IN THE MATTER OF: CITY OF OAKLAND PUBLIC ETHICS
  COMMISSION
  07/26/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel .; filed by CITY OF OAKLAND PUBLIC
  ETHICS COMMISSION (Petitioner) in Department 520
  While this issue does not affect the court’s adjudication of the present motion, Petitioner is
  advised for future subpoenas to make it abundantly clear either that only non-privileged
  documents are sought or that privileged documents may be withheld subject to a privilege log.
  This detail should not be hidden in the text of a definition, but explicitly called out in the
  document request itself – especially in connection with document categories seeking
  communications to or from Respondents’ counsel.
  CONCLUSION
  For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s motion to compel compliance with its investigative
  subpoenas is denied in its entirety. (2 C.C.R., § 10027 (d); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama (1958) 357
  U.S. 449, 460–461; Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 852–853; Roberts v. United
  States Jaycees (1984) 468 U.S. 609, 617–618; Pacific-Union, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d 60, 70.)
  NOTICE: This tentative ruling will automatically become the court’s final order on Friday July
  26, 2024 unless, by no later than 4:00 p.m. on Thursday July 25, 2024, a party to the action
  notifies BOTH: 1) the court by emailing De*****@al*****.gov ; AND 2) all opposing
  counsel or self- represented parties (by telephone or email) that the party is contesting this
  tentative ruling.
  The subject line (RE:) of the email must state: “Request for CONTESTED HEARING: [the case
  name], [number].” When a party emails to contest a tentative ruling, the party must identify the
  specific holding(s) within the ruling they wish to contest via oral argument.
  The court does not provide court reporters for hearings in civil departments. A party who wants a
  record of the proceedings must engage a private court reporter. (Local Rule 3.95.) Any privately
  retained court reporter must also participate via video conference. His/Her email must be
  provided to the court at the time the Notice of Contest is emailed.
  ALL CONTESTED LAW AND MOTION HEARINGS ARE CONDUCTED VIA REMOTE
  VIDEO unless an in person appearance is required by the court. Invitations to participate in the
  video proceeding will be sent by the court upon receipt of timely notice of contest. A party may
  give email notice he/she will appear in court in person for the hearing, however all other
  counsel/parties and the JUDGE MAY APPEAR REMOTELY.